EVIDENCE-ExPERT WITNESSES-PHYSICIAN MAY QUALIFY AS AN
EXPERT IN MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST CHIROPRACTOR-

Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 NJ. 318, 492 A.2d 371 (1985).
The medical "malpractice crisis"' has captivated the atten3
tion and energy of the medical profession,' the legal profession,
insurance companies, 4 the public at large,' and our legislators. 6
Malpractice, 7 however, is not unique to physicians and surgeons.
Case law has witnessed defendant professionals in the fields of
law, architecture, accounting, dentistry, pharmacy, chiropractic,
and many other professions and trades.' Although malpractice
complaints may plead a variety of causes of action,9 the great majority of suits are brought for professional negligence.10
In a negligence case, the plaintiff has the burden of proof."
Expert testimony is normally essential to the plaintiff's case in
order to establish a professional's deviation from the requisite

I The medical malpractice crisis is a combination of increased malpractice
claims, exorbitant awards and settlements of those claims, and "wildly escalating
malpractice insurance premiums." Redlich, Understandingthe Medical Malpractice Crisis, 57 N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1985, at 38, 38; see Blodgett, Malpractice Crisis?, 71 A.B.A.J.,
June 1985, at 18, 18.
2 See Wyrick & Peracchio, Malpractice: The Bitter Pill-The Insurance Industry:
Cashing in on a 'Crisis' (pt. 3), Newsday (Long Island, N.Y.), Oct. 29, 1985, at 5, col.
1.
3 See Blodgett, supra note 1; Redlich, supra note 1.
4 See Wyrick & Peracchio, supra note 2.
5 See Wyrick & Peracchio, Malpractice: The Bitter Pill (pts. 1, 2 & 3), Newsday
(Long Island, N.Y.), Oct. 27, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Oct. 28, 1985, at 5, col. 1; Oct. 29,
1985, at 5, col. 1.
6

See

EDUC.

&

SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,

WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973)

[hereinafter cited as MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE REPORT].

7 Malpractice is defined as "any professional misconduct, unreasonable lack of
skill or fidelity in professional or fiduciary duties, evil practice, or illegal or immoral
conduct." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1 11 (5th ed. 1979).
8 See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 185-86 & nn.22-31 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER & KEETON].

9 See Comment, Medical Malpractice-TheNecessity of Expert Testimony and the Use of
a General Physician as an Expert Witness in a Malpractice Action Against a Specialist, 10
OHIO N.U.L. REV. 37, 37 & n.2 (1983).
10 Id. The following four elements must be found to prove professional negli-

gence: (1) the defendant was under a duty to conform to a particular standard of
conduct; (2) the defendant's conduct failed to conform to this standard; (3) the
defendant's conduct was the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury or damage; and
(4) the plaintiff suffered actual damage. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 30,
at 164-65.
II Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 525, 435 A.2d 1150, 1157 (1981); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8, § 38, at 239.
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standard of care.' 2 The general rule regarding expert testimony
provides that the defendant is entitled to be judged according to
the standards of the profession or school13 of which he is a member. 1 4 The New Jersey Supreme Court recently carved out an
exception to this general rule.' 5 In Rosenberg v. Cahill,'6 the court
held that a physician could qualify as an expert witness in a malpractice action against a chiropractor.' 7
Lawrence Rosenberg, a minor, sustained injuries while using
a trampoline and subsequently experienced headaches and difficulty in moving his head.'" Rosenberg sought relief from Bruce
McElwain, a chiropractor.' 9 Although the parties disputed the
symptoms that Rosenberg related to McElwain, 2 it was clear that
12 See, e.g., Chamness v. Odum, 80 Ill. App. 3d" 98, 108, 399 N.E.2d 238, 246
(1979); Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 134, 167 A.2d 625, 628 (1961); Jones v.
Stess, 111 N.J. Super. 283, 287, 268 A.2d 292, 294 (App. Div. 1970); Lewis v. Read,
80 N.J. Super. 148, 170, 193 A.2d 255, 267 (App. Div. 1963); Toy v. Rickert, 53 N.J.
Super. 27, 32, 146 A.2d 510, 513 (App. Div. 1958); Steinke v. Bell, 32 N.J. Super.
67, 69, 107 A.2d 825, 826 (App. Div. 1954); see also Comment, supra note 9, at 38-39
(necessity of expert testimony).
13 One court has defined "school" as follows: "a) An institution of learning;
b) the doctrine, tenets, philosophy or theories taught or principles for which the
school stands; c) the standards, doctrines, or principles relating to a profession or
occupation in a given locality." Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 321, 67 P.2d
654, 658 (1937).
14 Sheppard v. Firth, 215 Or. 268, 271, 334 P.2d 190, 192 (1959).
15 See Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318, 492 A.2d 371 (1985).
16 99 N.J. 318, 492 A.2d 371 (1985).
17 Id. at 335, 492 A.2d at 380.
18 Id. at 323, 492 A.2d at 373.
'9 See id. Bruce McElwain first examined Rosenberg on August 22, 1980. Id.
The defendant's chiropractic consultation commenced three-and-a-half months
before a diagnosis of the plaintiff's medical problem was made. See Rosenberg v.
Cahill, No. 1-44823-81MM, at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 6, 1983) (transcript
of oral decision), aff'd, No. A-4697-82T5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 1, 1983),
rev'd, 99 N.J. 318, 492 A.2d 371 (1985).
Chiropractic diagnostic and treatment techniques vary according to the tenets
of the individual practitioner's school of training. See Note, Malpracticeand the Healing Arts-Naturopathy, Osteopathy, Chiropractic,9 UTAH L. REV. 705, 713 (1965). Chiropractic theory is the basic philosophy that all diseases and maladies stem from a
subluxation (a displacement that is less than a dislocation) of a single vertebra or
several vertebrae. Id. These subluxated vertebrae create pressure upon the nerves
that originate from the spinal cord. Id. Such pressure prevents normal nerve function and results in disease. Id. There are two schools of chiropractic thought. Id.
The straight or conservative school advocates examination and treatment of the
spine by manual manipulation. Id. The more progressive school incorporates additional forms of examination and treatment such as light, electricity, heat, vitamins, and water. Id. Defendant McElwain contended that he embraced the
philosophies of the "straight" school. Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 323, 492 A.2d at 373.
20 Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 323, 492 A.2d at 373. The plaintiffs contended that Lawrence Rosenberg had complained of symptoms related to Hodgkin's Disease. See
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McElwain
treated Rosenberg and that the initial visit included X
2
rays.

1

After the chiropractor read the X rays, treatments of "adjustments" to the spine were commenced to relieve a subluxated
vertebra. 22 In addition, the X rays revealed soft-tissue abnormalities, which were undetected by McElwain. 23 Because McElwain did not recognize the soft-tissue problem, he failed to refer
Rosenberg to a medical doctor. 24 McElwain's chiropractic treatments ended on November 28, 1980,25 and subsequently, Rosenberg discovered he had Hodgkin's disease. 6
Lawrence Rosenberg and his father Glenn brought a malpractice action against McElwain. 27 The plaintiffs alleged that
id. The defendant argued that Rosenberg's only complaints were of intermittent
headaches and range-of-motion difficulties in the use of his head, which had been
caused by an injury while trampolining. See id.
The plaintiffs further contended that Lawrence Rosenberg had consistently
complained of the Hodgkin's Disease symptoms for a year and one-half before his
illness was finally discovered. See id. at 322, 492 A.2d at 373. Nonetheless, Rosenberg's condition was not diagnosed until December 9, 1980. Rosenberg v. Cahill,
No. 1-44823-81MM, at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 6, 1983) (transcript of oral
decision), aff'd, No. A-4697-82T5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 1, 1983), rev'd, 99
N.J. 318, 492 A.2d 371 (1985).
21 Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 323, 492 A.2d at 373. The use of X rays is an essential
tool in the field of chiropractic. J. LANGONE, CHIROPRACTORS: A CONSUMER'S
GUIDE 72 (1982). They serve as a basis for diagnosis and provide documentary
records of improvement throughout the course of treatment. Id. Competent X-ray
technique and film interpretation are crucial in chiropractic treatment because the
determination of which components of the spinal column require realignment is
made through the X-ray readings. Id.
22 Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 323, 492 A.2d at 373. An adjustment involves manipulation of the spine to eliminate deficient nerve transmissions. See J. LANGONE, supra
note 21, at 78-79. Misaligned vertebrae are forced back into place by positioning a
portion of the hand against the appropriate poriton of the spine. See id. at 80. A
thrusting force in the proper direction is used to change the position of the vertebrae. Id. Following the initial "adjustment," Rosenberg visited McElwain on five
subsequent occasions. Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 323, 492 A.2d at 374.
23 See Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 323-24, 492 A.2d at 373-74.
24 Id., 492 A.2d at 374.
25 Id. at 323, 492 A.2d at 374.
26 Id. at 322, 492 A.2d at 373.
27 Id. The two plaintiffs in this case brought separate actions. See Complaint at
3-4, Rosenberg v. Cahill, No. 1-44823-81MM (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 6,
1983), aft'd, No. A-4697-82T5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 1, 1983), rev'd, 99
N.J. 318, 492 A.2d 371 (1985). Lawrence Rosenberg, the infant plaintiff, demanded damages for the pain and suffering he had endured as a result of the late
diagnosis of his condition. Id. at 2. Glenn Rosenberg sought recovery for the monetary and emotional damages he had sustained. Id. at 3.
The complaint also named as defendants two medical doctors, Michael J. Cahill and Richard McCarthy. Id. at 1. Dr. Cahill v s granted summary judgment in
March of 1983. Brief and Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, Rosenberg v. Ca-
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the chiropractor, after examining the X rays, negligently failed to
recognize the tissue abnormality that was later diagnosed as
Hodgkin's disease. 28 The defendant countered that because he
subscribed to the "straight chiropractic" school, 29 he reviewed
the X rays "chiropractically" and was not duty bound to notice
tissue abnormalities.3"
The plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Knapp, testified that the
defendant had failed to use reasonable care in reading the X
rays."' The trial court, however, determined that this medical expert was unqualified to testify about a chiropractor's standard of
care. 2 Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of
hill, 99 N.J. 318, 492 A.2d 371 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Brief]. A
pretrial order entered on May 13, 1983, after summary judgment was granted to
defendant McElwain by the court, involved only Dr. McCarthy. Id. at 1-2.
28 See Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 322, 492 A.2d at 373. Hodgkin's Disease is
a malignant disorder characterized by painless, progressive enlargement
of lymphoid tissue, usually first evident in cervical lymph nodes ...
Symptoms include anorexia, weight loss, generalized pruritus [a symptom of itching], low-grade fever, night sweats, anemia, and leukocytosis
[an abnormal increase in the number of circulating white blood
cells]. .

.

.

The diagnosis is established by blood studies, x rays,

lymphangiograms, lymph node biopsies, and ultrasonic and computerized tomographic scans.
MOSBY'S MEDICAL AND NURSING DICTIONARY 514 (1983).
29 See supra note 19 (defining the "straight chiropractic" school).
30 Rosenberg, 99 NJ. at 323, 492 A.2d at 373. Reading an X ray "chiropractically" means to look solely for alterations in the vertebrae, not to detect soft tissue
irregularities or make any other medical diagnoses. See Brief and Appendix for
Defendant-Respondent at 2, Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 NJ. 318, 492 A.2d 371 (1985);
see also infra note 132 (discussing the "straight chiropractic" school).
31 See Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 324, 492 A.2d at 374. Dr. Knapp, a medical doctor,
admitted he was not a trained radiologist (a physician with specialized training in
reading X rays) and was unfamiliar with chiropractic education and practice. See
Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 27, at 8. He testified that a chiropractor " 'should be
able to recognize an abnormal X-ray if he's taking them, he might not diagnose a
condition, but he should recognize that it's abnormal and put it into the hands of
someone who can diagnose.'" Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
32 Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 324, 492 A.2d at 374. Judge Marshall Selikoff delivered
the opinion of the trial court. See Rosenberg v. Cahill, No. 1-44823-81MM (NJ.
Super. Ct. Law Div. May 6, 1983) (transcript of oral decision), aff'd, No. A-469782T5 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 1, 1983), rev'd, 99 NJ. 318, 492 A.2d 371
(1985). He determined that defendant McElwain was "not competent to read Xrays for medical purposes." Id. at 3. Because McElwain espoused tenets of the
straight chiropractic school, he analyzed the plaintiff's X rays and examined the
spine only to locate vertebral subluxations. Id. at 4. Therefore, the lower court
concluded, his diagnosis and treatment of the plaintiff could not be proven to have
fallen below the established and recognized standard of care of his profession. Id.
The court thus held that the plaintiff had failed to prove by Dr. Knapp's expert
testimony that defendant McElwain had deviated from the requisite standard of
care. Rosenberg, 99 NJ. at 324, 492 A.2d at 374.
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the defendant McElwain."
The appellate division affirmed the trial court's decision.34
The New Jersey Supreme Court then granted certification 35 and
reversed the appellate court's decision.
The supreme court
unanimously held that a licensed medical doctor is competent to
testify as an expert witness concerning a chiropractor's standard
of care when such testimony pertains to matters that both chiropractic and medicine "share in common in terms of education,
' 37
training and licensure.

The general rule of law concerning expert witnesses is that a
physician is entitled to be judged according to the philosophies
of the school to which he belongs. 38 The term "school" has been
defined as the theories and standards adopted by a particular,
specialized profession.3 9 The law has been cognizant of the
existence of various schools of medicine with their different tenets and methodologies.4 ° One court has stated that "[e]ach
school of medicine is entitled to practice in its own way, and because one does not use the methods of the other is no reason for
holding the one for malpractice." ' 4 1 Similarly, courts have held
that drugless healers 42 are also entitled to be judged according to
43
the standards of the school to which they belong.
The "same school" rule has made it more difficult for a litigant to obtain an expert witness who will testify to a defendant's
deviation from the accepted professional standards of his medical
profession.44 This is because professionals are often reluctant to
testify against one another. 45 This reluctance has been termed
33 Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 324, 492 A.2d at 374.
34 Id.

35 Id.

36 Id. at 335, 492 A.2d at 380.
37 Id. at 334, 492 A.2d at 379.
38 See Ison v. McFall, 55 Tenn. App. 326, 355, 400 S.W.2d 243, 256 (1964).
39 See supra note 13 (defining "school").
40 See Comment, supra note 9, at 58-59 & n. 111.
41 Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 495, 219 P.2d 79, 87, cert. denied, 340 U.S.
892 (1950).
42 Drugless healers include allopaths, homeopaths, osteopaths, naturopaths,
physiotherapists, and chiropractors. See generally Note, supra note 19 (discussing
growth of healing arts and concomitant malpractice law).
43 E.g., Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 190-91, 205 N.W. 159, 161 (1925)
(chiropractors judged by standards of chiropractic school); Sheppard v. Firth, 215
Or. 268, 272, 334 P.2d 190, 192 (1959) (same).
44 See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
45 See Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 561-62 (D.C. 1982); Carbone v.
Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 427, 94 A.2d 680, 684 (1953) ("there is a 'well known
reluctance of the members of the medical profession to testify against a fellow prac-
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the "conspiracy of silence."' 46 The judiciary has recognized the
existence of this phenomenon and the handicaps it has presented
for innocent victims who have received no relief because of their
inability to procure expert witnesses. 47 To alleviate this injustice,
courts have created innovative techniques that eliminate the requirement of expert testimony in appropriate cases.48
49
One such technique is the "common knowledge doctrine."
New Jersey law is replete with cases that embrace this doctrine,
which obviates the need for a plaintiff to obtain an expert to tesIn
tify concerning a defendant's professional negligence.50
Klimko v. Rose, 5 an expert witness was not needed to allow a jury
to find a chiropractor guilty of malpractice when his patient suffered a stroke and temporary paralysis as a result of the chiropractic treatments. 52 The patient experienced dizziness and
sweatiness, which common knowledge and experience suggested
titioner' and . . . this reluctance confronts the plaintiff in a malpractice case with a
serious 'problem of proof' "). See generally Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 CLEV.MAR. L. REV. 520 (1965) (discussing problems posed by reluctance of physicians to
testify against one another); Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16 CATm. U.L. REV. 158 (1966) (same).
46 See Seidelson, supra note 45, at 159. The author defines conspiracy of silence
as "the refusal on the part of members of the profession to testify against one of
their own for fear that one day they, too, may be defendants in a malpractice case."
Id. (footnote omitted).
47 See generally Stutt, Negligence of Drugless Healers: Chiropractors,Wis. B. BULL., July
1985, at 22, 24 ("Justice is denied to an injured patient if his rights can not be
vindicated because of proof standards which fail to account for the realities of the
marketplace.").
48 See Seidelson, supra note 45, at 160. Courts have used res ipsa loquitur and
"the newer doctrines of 'common knowledge,' 'ulterior act,' 'mechanical instrument,' or 'informed consent' " to eliminate the necessity of expert testimony in
many cases. Id. (footnote omitted).
49 See Jones v. Stess, 111 N.J. Super. 283, 287, 268 A.2d 292, 295 (App. Div.
1970). The common knowledge doctrine is the well-recognized exception to the
need for expert testimony "where the facts are such that it may be said, looking at
[the matter] in the light of the 'common knowledge and experience' of laymen, that
there has been a lapse from the standard." Id.
50 See, e.g., Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 527, 435 A.2d 1150, 1157-58
(1981); Klimko v. Rose, 84 N.J. 496, 503-04, 422 A.2d 418, 422 (1980); Sanzari v.
Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 141-42, 167 A.2d 625, 632 (1961); Jones v. Stess, 111 N.J.
Super. 283, 287, 268 A.2d 292, 295 (App. Div. 1970); Lewis v. Read, 80 N.J. Super.
148, 170-71, 193 A.2d 255, 267 (App. Div. 1963); Becker v. Eisenstodt, 60 N.J.
Super. 240, 246, 158 A.2d 706, 710 (App. Div. 1960); Steinke v. Bell, 32 N.J. Super.
67, 69, 107 A.2d 825, 826 (App. Div. 1954); Gould v. Winokur, 98 N.J. Super. 554,
565, 237 A.2d 916, 922 (Law Div. 1968), aff'd, 104 N.J. Super. 329, 250 A.2d 38
(App. Div. 1969).
51 84 N.J. 496, 422 A.2d 418 (1980).
52 See id. at 497, 505, 422 A.2d at 418, 422.
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were potentially dangerous symptoms.

53

The court held that

technical knowledge was unnecessary for the jury to find that a
reasonably prudent chiropractor should have terminated the patient's neck adjustment treatments when confronted with these
symptoms.54 The court explained that knowledge is common
when, "whether technical or not, it is... possessed by untrained
laymen of ordinary experience and intelligence.' 5 The common
knowledge doctrine has therefore been germane only in cases
where a professional's5 6 negligence has been readily apparent to
the average lay juror.
Another way courts have eased the plaintiff's burden of procuring an expert witness has been through recognition of exceptions to the general rule of law that a physician from one school
is ineligible to testify in a malpractice case against a physician
from another school.57 One exception to the general rule of ex'
pert testimony has been termed "overlapping." 58
Overlapping
exists when technical knowledge or clinical experience is common to two or more medical specialties. 9
The decision in Hilgedorfv. Bertschinger60 illustrates the overlap exception. Following a surgical procedure to alleviate a patient's irregular menstruation, a naturopath packed the patient's
vagina with unsterilized lamb's wool. 6 ' This procedure resulted
62
in an infection and required surgical removal of the packing.
The court admitted a regular physician's testimony in the malpractice action against the naturopath because the testimony of
the physician related to philosophies of sterilization common to
both schools of training.63 Accordingly, the court held that
where the method of treatment in the defendant's school was the
same as the expert witness's school, the plaintiff's expert witness
53 Id. at 505, 422 A.2d at 422.
54 See id.

Id. at 504, 422 A.2d at 422.
See supra note 50 (cases explaining common knowledge doctrine).
57 See generally Comment, supra note 9, at 52-69 (discussing qualifications of expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases).
58 Klimko, 84 N.J. at 506 n.5, 422 A.2d at 423 n.5.
59 See Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 136, 167 A.2d 625, 629 (1961) ("some
facets of professional practice fall within the province of more than one profession"); Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 491, 219 P.2d 79, 85 ("some subjects
taught in medical schools are also taught in the drugless healing schools"), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950).
60 132 Or. 641, 285 P. 819 (1930).
61 Id. at 645, 285 P. at 821.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 646, 285 P. at 821.
55
56
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was not restricted to the defendant's specialty or school of
thought.64
The courts have recognized a second exception to the "same
school" rule when a physician departs from the tenets of his licensed specialty and treats a disorder that is within the scope of
another specialty. 65 For example, in Kelly v. Carroll,66 the court
admitted a surgeon's testimony in a malpractice suit against a
chiropractor whose patient died from untreated appendicitis.6 7
The chiropractor attempted to alleviate the patient's abdominal
pains by prescribing laxatives and enemas, which were regarded
to be within the province of medical treatments.68 The court
held that the chiropractor should have recognized the symptoms
of appendicitis and should have terminated his prescribed treatments upon observing the patient's rapidly deteriorating condition. 69 Furthermore, the court found that the chiropractor failed
to refer his patient to a medical doctor when the situation obviously warranted such referral. 70 The chiropractor was therefore
held to the recognized medical standard of care because of his
use of medical treatments. 7 '
Various other exceptions to the "same school" rule have
been developed by the courts.7 2 One exception has been applied
when the methods of treatment in the defendant's school should
have been the same as that of the witness's school,73 or when the
defendant attempted to substantiate his method of treatment by
the standards of another school. 4 Another exception to the
"same school" rule has been used in cases employing X rays because the field of radiology has been deemed a subject.common
See id. at 646-47, 285 P. at 821.
See, e.g., Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 219 P.2d 79, cert. denied, 340 U.S.
892 (1950).
66 36 Wash. 2d 482, 219 P.2d 79, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950).
67 See id. at 493, 219 P.2d at 85-86.
68 See id. at 484-85, 219 P.2d at 81.
69 See id. at 485, 494, 219 P.2d at 82, 86.
70 See id. at 485-86, 219 P.2d at 81-82.
71 See id. at 493, 219 P.2d at 86.
72 See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., Foster v. Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 170 S. 459 (1936); Wemett v.
Mount, 134 Or. 305, 292 P. 93 (1930); Treptau v. Behrens Spa, Inc., 247 Wis. 438,
20 N.W.2d 108 (1945) (all holding that testimony of a physician whose school is
different from defendant's is admissible when pertaining to precepts followed by
both schools).
74 See, e.g.,James v. Falk, 226 Or. 535, 360 P.2d 546 (1961) (surgeon permitted
to testify against osteopath when osteopath treated a patient in a medically prescribed manner).
64

65
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to all schools of medicine. 75 A further exception in which a physician may testify against a defendant from a different school has
occurred in situations where the defendant embraced tenets of
an unrecognized school.76
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized yet another exception to the "same school" rule when the testimony of
the expert was based on his knowledge of the defendant's
school.7 7 In Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 78 the court permitted a physician
to testify in a malpractice action against a dentist 79 whose patient

died from a stroke as a result of a contraindicated combination of
an anesthetic and epinephrine. 80 Despite the fact that he never
attended dental school, the physician's testimony was admitted
because he possessed considerable knowledge of the dental field
through his specialty in dental anesthesiology."'
Case law has not always required an expert witness to be as
highly qualified as the Sanzari witness."2 For instance, in Sinz v.
Owens,8 3 the California Supreme Court allowed a general practitioner to testify as an expert against an orthopedist.8 4 In that
case, the plaintiff had suffered a broken leg in a traffic accident,
and the leg had been fitted with a cast before appropriate treatment was given, resulting in an improperly healed bone. 5 Because the expert was familiar with the medical care at issue
through "occupational experience," the court held that he was a
qualified witness.8 6
Other courts, 7 like the Sinz court, have allowed the general
75 See, e.g., Dorr, Gray &Johnston v. Headstream, 173 Ark. 1104, 295 S.W. 16
(1927); Shockley v. Tucker, 127 Iowa 456, 103 N.W. 360 (1905); Henslin v. Wheaton, 91 Minn. 219, 97 N.W. 882 (1904) (all holding that because X ray is a specific
branch of science independent of any particular school, X-ray experts may testify
against defendants from different schools).
76 See, e.g., Longan v. Weltmer, 180 Mo. 322, 79 S.W. 655 (1904) (physician permitted to testify against magnetic healer who rendered unrecognized and unacceptable treatment); Hansen v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 187 P. 282 (1920) (physician
permitted to testify against Chinese herb doctor who held himself out as a
physician).
77 See Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1961).
78 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1961).
79 See id. at 138, 167 A.2d at 630.
80 See id. at 132-33, 167 A.2d at 627.
81 See id. at 137-38, 167 A.2d at 629-30.
82 See, e.g., Sinz v. Owen, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949).
83 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3 (1949).
84 Id. at 756, 205 P.2d at 7.
85 See id. at 752, 205 P.2d at 4.
86 Id. at 753, 205 P.2d at 5.
87 See, e.g., Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 97 Cal. App. 2d 557, 218 P.2d 66

754

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:745

physician to testify against the specialist in appropriate cases because both practitioners have had the same basic education. 8
These courts have held that the specialization of a witness bears
on the weight of his testimony, rather than on the determination
of whether the witness is qualified to testify as an expert.8 9 The
New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that a physician's training
and experience show "sufficient qualifications to allow him to
state his opinion, leaving to the jury the determination of its
worth." 90

Courts have also exercised considerable discretion in establishing the requisite degree of the expert's familiarity with the
medical conduct at issue.9 ' Some courts have concluded that the
witness must have personally performed or carried out the treatment in question.92 Other courts have held that mere familiarity
with the disputed treatment, without experience through personal performance, is sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert.93 Still other courts have determined that a witness's
general medical training and experience constitute sufficient
qualification for his testimony as an expert.94 Furthermore, if a
technique were rare or unique, some courts have determined that
a witness need not have experience with the technique in order
to qualify as an expert.95
In Rosenberg v. Cahill, the New Jersey Supreme Court examined both the "common knowledge" exception to the expert
(1950); Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680 (1953); Young v. Stevens,
132 N.J.L. 124, 39 A.2d 115 (1944).
88 See Comment, supra note 9, at 56. The specialist differs from the general physician because he possesses three to six additional years of training and clinical
experience in a residency program in his chosen specialty. See id. The specialist is
also held to a higher standard of care than the general physician. Id.
89 See, e.g., Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 426, 94 A.2d 680, 684 (1953);
Ison v. McFall, 55 Tenn. App. 326, 362, 400 S.W.2d 243, 259 (1964).
90 Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 426, 94 A.2d 680, 684 (1953).
91 See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., Dow v. Kaiser Found., 12 Cal. App. 3d 488, 499, 90 Cal. Rptr. 747,
753 (1970); Pearce v. Linde, 113 Cal. App. 2d 627, 629-30, 248 P.2d 506, 507-08
(1952); Swanson v. Chatterton, 281 Minn. 129, 135-36, 160 N.W.2d 662, 666-67
(1968).
93 See, e.g., Gatson v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 44, 588 P.2d 326, 337 (1978); Pietrzyk v. City of Detroit, 123 Mich. App. 244, 248, 333 N.W.2d 236, 237-38 (1983);
Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 425, 94 A.2d 680, 683 (1953).
94 See, e.g., Ragan v. Steen, 229 Pa. Super. 515, 521-22, 331 A.2d 724, 728
(1974); Quinley v. Cocke, 183 Tenn. 428, 435-36, 192 S.W.2d 992, 996 (1946).
95 See, e.g., Kershaw v. Tilbury, 214 Cal. 679, 691-92, 8 P.2d 109, 114 (1932);
Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal. App. 2d 485, 492, 96 P.2d 142, 145-46 (1939).
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witness requirement 9 6 and the "same school" doctrine. 97 First,
the court dispensed with the plaintiffs' contention that the defendant's negligence could have been determined by the "common knowledge" of the jurors.9 8 Justice Handler, writing for a
unanimous court, explained that the common knowledge doctrine would be suitably employed only when the chiropractor's
failure to meet the applicable standard of care was "readily apparent." 99 The court, adopting the rule enunciated in the Washington Court of Appeals decision in Mostrom v. Pettibon,'0 0 defined
the chiropractic standard of care as (1) distinguishing a medical
problem from a chiropractic one, (2) refraining from chiropractic
treatment that could cause possible injury to the patient given
the existence of a medical problem, and (3) referring the patient
to a physician when a medical problem is diagnosed. 10 The
court stated that because the plaintiff testified that the abnormalities in the X rays had to be pointed out to him, the common
knowledge doctrine could not be appropriately used in this
case.' 0 2 Therefore, the court held that expert testimony was nec10 3
essary to establish the defendant's negligence.
The court next addressed the predominant issue in the Rosenberg case-whether a licensed medical doctor could be competent to testify as to the chiropractic standard of care, which is not
within the physician's field of expertise. 1 4 Justice Handler recognized the general rule that " 'the [expert] witness must be a
licensed member of the profession whose standards he professes
to know.' "105 The court also embraced the overlap theory, however, and noted that one professional "who is 'familiar' with the
situation in issue" could be a competent witness "to testify as to
the 'accepted practice' " of another professional.' 0 6
The court then scrutinized the similarities and differences
between chiropractors and medical doctors.'0 7 The court stated
that while both professions are concerned with healing their pa96
97
98
99

See
See
Id.
See
100 25

Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 324-27, 492 A.2d at 374-75.
id. at 327-34, 492 A.2d at 375-79.
at 324, 492 A.2d at 374.
id. at 325, 492 A.2d at 374-75.
Wash. App. 158, 163, 607 P.2d 864, 867 (1980).

101 See Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 332, 492 A.2d at 378.

102 See id. at 327, 492 A.2d at 375.
103 Id.
104 Id., 492 A.2d at 375-76.
105 Id. at 328, 492 A.2d at 376 (quoting Sanzari, 34 N.J. at 136, 167 A.2d at 629).
106

Id. (quoting Sanzari, 34 N.J. at 136, 167 A.2d at 629).

107 See id. at 328-31, 492 A.2d at 376-78.
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tients, chiropractors are limited to performing manual adjustments to the spine.'0 8 The court discerned a great deal of
similarity between chiropractors and medical doctors, however,
in their clinical and licensing requirements in the areas of X rays
and diagnosis. 10 9 Furthermore, the court found a commonality
of statutory educational requirements between chiropractors and
doctors.1 ' The court thus recognized the existence of "overlapping" between the two specialties."' Therefore, the supreme
court held that a medical doctor qualified as an expert witness
under the facts of this malpractice case because he was familiar
with X-ray techniques common to both the medical and chiropractic fields.' 1 2 Justice Handler limited this holding, however,
to malpractice cases in which the chiropractor's standard of care
108 Id. at 328-29, 492 A.2d at 376. The New Jersey statute defining and regulating the practice of chiropractic provides that
the practice of chiropractic is defined as follows: "A system of adjusting
the articulations of the spinal column by manipulation thereof." A licensed chiropractor shall have the right in the examination of patients
to use the neurocalometer, X-ray, and other necessary instruments
solely for the purpose of diagnosis or analysis. No licensed chiropractor
shall use endoscopic or cutting instruments, or prescribe, administer, or
dispense drugs or medicines for any purpose whatsoever, or perform
surgical operations excepting adjustment of the articulations of the spinal column.
No person licensed to practice chiropractic shall sign any certificate
required by law or the State Sanitary Code concerning reportable diseases, or birth, marriage or death certificates.
No person licensed to practice chiropractic shall use the title doctor
or its abbreviation in the practice of chiropractic unless it be qualified by
the word "chiropractic."
It shall be unlawful for any person, not duly licensed in this State to
practice chiropractic, to use terms, titles, words or letters which would
designate or imply that he or she is qualified to practice chiropractic, or
to hold himself or herself out as being able to practice chiropractic, or
offer or attempt to practice chiropractic.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-14.5 (West 1978).
109 Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 331, 492 A.2d at 377-78.
110 Id. at 330, 492 A.2d at 377. The requirements for approval of colleges of
chiropractic may be found in N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 35-2.4 (Supp. 1984). The
required curriculum includes courses in anatomy, embryology, histology, physiology, diagnosis and symptomatology, pathology, bacteriology, laboratory technique,
chemistry, neurology, hygiene, gynecology, obstetrics, spinography, endocrinology, dermatology, pediatrics, special senses, jurisprudence, and principles of chiroporactic. Id. § 35-2.40). These courses are similar to those required of doctors and
surgeons. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-41.5 (West 1978) (licensing requirements
for chiropractors) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-15 (West 1978) (licensing requirements for doctors and surgeons).
I'I Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 331, 492 A.2d at 378.
112 See id. at 331-32, 492 A.2d at 378.
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was "within the doctor's field of expertise."' "1 3
The testimony of an expert may be the pivotal element in a
jury's decision to award a patient a multi-million-dollar verdict.
In addition, the testimony of a plaintiff's expert has the devastating potential of ruining a physician's reputation, career, and psychological well-being. 1 4 Likewise, a defendant's expert's
testimony may have the ravaging effect of failing to compensate a
patient for excruciating pain and suffering. Hence, the ostensible
ruination of an individual's life is often contingent upon the credibility of an expert's testimony.
The essence of expert testimony is cloaked with doctrines of
uncertain scope. One problem that manifests itself in conjunction with expert witnesses is that the standards and the qualifications of experts have not been clearly delineated. With the
recognition of the "overlap phenomenon,"' 1 5 physicians often
testify about issues outside their specialties. Clarification and
uniformity, however, must be infused into the concept of the expert witness by clearly stipulating the expert's qualifications. Direct, reliable, and unambiguous criteria are crucial. Such
standards must "be defined in terms that are judicially manageable and reviewable." ' "1 6 One commentator has proposed that
comprehensive state statutes be enacted to set forth the qualifications of medical witnesses." 7 Such legislation would create uniform criteria within the court system,"' facilitate both parties'
case preparation, and eliminate the need for the court's discretion in admitting an expert's testimony.
A second problem related to expert witnesses is evidenced
once the expert testimony is admitted. It is then within the realm
of the jury to determine the competency and inadequacies of the
expert's opinion. This determination will ascertain the weight
and value to be given to the testimony.'l 9 To help alleviate the
jury's incertitude concerning the competency of the expert, it has
been suggested that juries award verdicts based solely on "clear
"13

Id. at 332, 492 A.2d at 378.

114 See generally MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 20 (discussing im-

pact on physicians).
115 See supra notes 57-64 (discussing "overlapping").
116 See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 630 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing standard to be used in identifying racial discrimination).
117 See Comment, supra note 9, at 70.
118 Id.
119 See Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 138, 167 A.2d 625, 630 (1961); Carbone
v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 426, 94 A.2d 680, 684 (1953).

758

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:745

and convincing evidence."' 120 Presently, the standard juries most
often use for awarding damages in malpractice cases is much easier to meet-a "fair preponderance" of the evidence. 12 ' The
United States Supreme Court recently noted in Santosky v.
Kramer 122 that the "fair preponderance" test is usually applied
because society has only a minimal stake in the outcome. 123 Soci-

ety's interest in the results of an increasing number of malpractice lawsuits12 4 ismore than de minimis, however. A "clear and
convincing" standard is preferable because it would reduce the
number of suits by eliminating frivolous claims and yet fully com25
pensate the innocent injured plaintiff.
The evolution of cases with skewed sympathies for the plaintiffs has contributed to the pervasive medical malpractice crisis. 12 6 Many doctors have retired early to avoid the pain and
trauma of a potential suit. 1 27 Others have raised their fees to

cover their increasing malpractice insurance premiums and have
refused to manage risky cases. 128 Still others have practiced defensive medicine.t 29 As a result, growing numbers of people
have sought chiropractic treatment.13 0 The field of chiropractic,
however, is a part of the medical malpractice crisis.131
The defendant in Rosenberg referred to himself as a disciple
of "straight chiropractic."'13

2

Although the public is generally

Redlich, supra note 1, at 42.
See id. at 39.
455 U.S. 745 (1982).
See id. at 755.
See Blodgett, supra note 1, at 18 (malpractice suits have tripled in volume in
the last decade).
125 Redlich, supra note 1, at 56.
126 See supra notes 48 & 57-58 and accompanying text (showing relaxed standard
of expert testimony makes it easier for plaintiffs to prove their case).
127 See Wyrick & Peracchio (pt. 1), supra note 5, Oct. 27, 1985, at 29, col. 1.
128 See id.
129 See infra note 151 (defining defensive medicine).
130 See Stutt, supra note 47, at 22. The evident profusion in chiropractic treatments has manifested a corresponding increase in the number of chiropractic lawsuits. Id.
131 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
132 See Rosenberg, 99 NJ. at 323, 492 A.2d at 373. In a 1979 case, a New Jersey
court enunciated the philosophies of the "straight" chiropractic school as follows:
The "straight" chiropractor is concerned with analyzing the spinal column for the detection and elimination of nervous system interferences
known as vertebral subluxations .... The practice of "straight" chiropractic requires an exacting scientific spinal analysis for the location of
vertebral subluxations, and the application of the most advanced techniques available for the subsequent correction of the vertebral subluxations. Medical procedures including, but not limited to, the diagnosis,
120
121
122
123
124
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aware of different approaches, techniques, and philosophies between medicine and chiropractic, there is scant public awareness
of the various techniques and approaches within chiropractic.
The divergence occurs with differing opinions concerning the
character of a subluxation and the importance it should be accorded as an etiological factor in disease.1 33 The adopted theory
of the chiropractor controls a patient's treatment.' 34 The difference in philosophies is substantial and can be a crucial factor in a
person's health care. Summarily, the "straight" chiropractor is
unconcerned with medical diagnosis whereas "[t]he 'mixing' chiropractor is concerned with full body (internal and external) examination, diagnosis, prognosis and treatment of disease
through a wide range of procedures." 135 Most importantly, because the "straight" chiropractor is unconcerned with medical diagnosis, there is no referral to a physician when the problem is
medical rather than chiropractic, whereas the "mixing" chiro1 36
practor will refer cases that he is unable to treat.
Historically, courts have been unconcerned with the merits
of the various systems of health care.' 37 Rather, the law has concentrated on the competency of those rendering health care in
order to protect public health, safety, and welfare. A patient consults either a doctor or a chiropractor because of his belief that
the practitioner "has special knowledge and skill in diagnosing
and treating diseases and disorders." 138 State licensing laws govern the required knowledge and skill of doctors and other drugless healers such as chiropractors. The purpose of such laws is to
banish incompetents from treating the public, thereby protecting
patients from potential harm. 139 For example, a licensed chiroprognosis and treatment of disease add nothing to "straight" chiropractic. The "straight" chiropractor has no interest, professionally or legislatively, in adding medical procedures or services to his practice.
In re Sherman College of Straight Chiropractic, 164 N.J. Super. 519, 524, 397 A.2d
362, 364-65 (App. Div. 1979) (quoting a letter from Sherman College to the president of the New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners).
133 See J. LANGONE,
134 See id.

supra note 21, at 27.

135 In re Sherman College of Straight Chiropractic, 164 N.J. Super. 519, 524, 397
A.2d 362, 365 (App. Div. 1979).
136 See id.
137 SeeJanssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 190, 205 N.W. 159, 161 (1925); Sheppard v. Firth, 215 Or. 268, 272, 334 P.2d 190, 192 (1959); Walkenhorst v. Kesler,
92 Utah 312, 342, 67 P.2d 654, 666 (1937).
138 Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 498, 219 P.2d 79, 88 (citation omitted), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950).
139 See id. at 502, 219 P.2d at 90.
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practor in New Jersey is required to have completed four years at
an accredited chiropractic college and to have passed an examination comprising anatomy, physiology, pathology, bacteriology,
chemistry, hygiene, therapeutics of chiropractic, and nonsurgical
diagnosis. 14' Not surprisingly, a patient relies on his chiropractor's qualifications. The chiropractor thus has a duty to advise
his patient if he knows or should know that his treatments will
not be beneficial. 14 In appropriate situations, he also has a duty
to refer his patient to a physician who can render proper treatment. 42 A patient should be able to rely on the chiropractor's
full adherence to these duties. A timely diagnosis may be a patient's last chance to make a full recovery or any recovery at all.
Valuable time expended on futile treatments, which are harmless
in and of themselves, may be irreversibly harmful or fatal if there
43
is a delay of proper treatment."
The difference between "straight" or "mixed" chiropractic
theories can mean the difference between a timely and an untimely diagnosis. New Jersey law has not differentiated between
these two theories and should continue to avoid recognizing any
distinctions. The Rosenberg court circumvented the issue by discussing a physician's qualifications to attest to a chiropractor's
deviant standard of care. 14 4 The court indulged in judicial creativity to accomplish its short-term goal of rendering justice to an
injured plaintiff. A contrary verdict allowing the defendant to be
judged according to the tenets of his own school would have triggered a response hastening effectuation of the long-term goal of
eliminating the problematic discrepancy between the two chiropractic schools of thought. The remedy to this problem, however, lies not with the courts but with the legislature.
It can be argued that a patient assumes the risk when he
seeks the care of a chiropractor because "any person who engages a chiropractor, knowing him to be such, is presumed to
know to whom he is going and what his theory is.' 1 4 5 Patients
seeking the care of chiropractors, however, should assume only
the risk consistent with a presumed conception that chiropractic
is a "limited activity relating to a particularly limited kind of
140

See N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 45:9-41.5 (West 1978).

141 Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482,497, 219 P.2d 79, 88 (citation omitted), cert.

denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950).
142

Id.

143

Id. at 498, 219 P.2d at 88.
See Rosenberg, 99 N.J. at 328-32, 492 A.2d at 376-78.
Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 347, 67 P.2d 654, 670 (1937).
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treatment."' 146 Patients should be able to assume, without risk,
that the chiropractor will make a differential diagnosis between a
medical and chiropractic problem and will refer his patients to
physicians when medically necessary. New Jersey law is consisa chiropractor to be proficient
tent with this theory in requiring
14 7
diagnosis.
nonsurgical
in
The field of chiropractic should be rid of the straight-mixed
dichotomy. Such a division confuses patients who are generally
ignorant as to the specific techniques of chiropractic.' 48 Licensing statutes prescribe educational and clinical requirements for
all chiropractors regardless of the philosophy one adopts.
Therefore, because all New Jersey chiropractors must be trained
in nonsurgical diagnosis, 4 9 there is no excuse for declining to
make such a diagnosis. "Straight" chiropractic is potentially
harmful, if not lethal, to a patient with a medical problem who is
not expediently referred to a physician. To acknowledge the
existence of "straight" chiropractic is to allow a chiropractor to
deny liability upon his failure to refer a patient to a physician
when such a referral is warranted. Veiling such negligence in the
embodiment of a "philosophy" is unconscionable and dangerous
to public health and safety.
Public discontent and outcry is needed to pressure legislators to change chiropractic licensing statutes to stipulate clearly
the responsibilities of all chiropractors. As greater numbers of
people seek chiropractic care, more stringent educational and
clinical training requirements are needed in the licensing statutes. Currently, only seven and one-half percent of the four-year
course of chiropractic study is devoted to diagnosis and symptomatology.' 5 ° Clearly, this is inadequate when diagnosis of a
medical problem by a chiropractor requires prompt referral to a
physician. The public's health and safety mandates legislative
scrutiny and the revamping of chiropractic licensing laws.
The malpractice crisis has penetrated every fiber of society.
As medical costs rise and doctors begin practicing defensive
medicine,'"' public health and safety lapses into precarious
146

Id. at 338, 67 P.2d at 666.

147 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-41.5 (West 1978).
148 J. LANGONE, supra note 21, at 28.

See text accompanying supra note 147.
See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 35-2.4(j) (Supp. 1984).
The Federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare defines defensive
medicine as "the alteration of modes of medical practice, induced by the threat of
liability, for the principal purposes of forestalling the possibility of lawsuits by pa149
150
151
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chaos. Alternative health care systems such as chiropractic are
problematic and are often inadequate in their provision of appropriate and vital medical care. The blame for this vexing state of
affairs is shared by everyone. 5 2 The solution lies in the hands of
doctors, lawyers, victims, insurance companies, legislators, and
the courts. Society shares the common goal of protecting the
public through an efficient, competent, and quality health care
system.
Marjorie 0. Smith
tients as well as providing a good legal defense in the event such lawsuits are instituted." MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 14.
152 See The Malpractice Mess, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17, 1986, at 74, 74-75.

